The Southern Poverty Law Center’s online Intelligence Report has a recent article on the topic of academic freedom and racism in the college classroom. The article can be found at this link: http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=754
Academic freedom is critical for the advancement of knowledge and understanding. Scholars in the sciences, humanities, and arts have to know that their research, writing, and teaching pursuits will not be infringed because of political expediency, corporate interest, or the whim of public opinion.
There are limits to academic freedom. Many academic disciplines and programs have curriculum elements that are prescribed. For example, when I teach a course like “Introduction to Anthropology,” there are certain topics that I am expected to teach. Technically, this abridges my free action in that I have to teach these topics. This is not a bad thing, and my freedom to pursue my research and writing is not infringed upon. Nor for that matter is my freedom to have a perspective on the topics I teach in that course abridged – and I have any number of ways available to go about teaching about human evolution, language, human culture, etc.
Another limit to academic freedom in the classroom has to do with truth, or more precisely with untruth. There is a reasonable expectation on the part of students and the public (including other faculty) that a teaching professor is knowledgeable about the topic they are teaching and that they present the facts of the topic in an accurate manner.
Ideally, people should be knowledgeable about matters that they hold forth about. As the B-52s song “Mesopotamia” says, “Before I speak, I should read a book.” Still, in general people should be free to express whatever the like, even the nonsensical or offensive. And when people say offensive things, others should freely express their offense. As I wrote in my previous post, for example, I’m against both Holocaust Denial and Holocaust Denial laws.
The classroom is different though. Again, there’s a reasonable assumption that what a professor says is accurate and based on expertise. When a professor presents information which is manifestly untrue as if it were true, they’re not just expressing themselves. They’re actively causing harm to the education of their students. In that context, it’s entirely reasonable to restrict things like Holocaust Denial or the presentation of other racist untruth as established fact.
At the same time, I’m wary of formulating restrictions on academic freedom in general. There are too many people who’d like to influence academics’ freedom under the guise of protecting “truth” or “balance” or “academic freedom.” One example: a couple years ago, in the Florida state legislature a bill was introduced (thankfully, it didn’t pass) that would have required balance in the teaching of human origins, the clear and fairly explicit goal of which was to force professors to teach creationism alongside evolution in the guise of protecting students’ academic freedom and scientific debate about truth.
Showing posts with label free action. Show all posts
Showing posts with label free action. Show all posts
Tuesday, June 5, 2007
Thursday, May 24, 2007
Energy, Development, and Independence
Energy has been an important topic of anthropological discussion and debate at least since the publication of Leslie White’s The Science of Culture (1949). I don’t want (at least in this specific context) to re-open old debates about teleology, cultural evolution, or White’s pseudo-algebraic formulation of the relationship between cultural development, energy and technology (C = E x T).
I do think, though, that White pointed out something essential about energy and culture. Obviously the meeting of basic needs is directly related to harnessing energy. Eating is the most fundamental way in which we harness energy that can then be used for other purposes. Individuals and societies that can’t harness the energy they need to provision all their essential needs must perish. What White was pointing out was that economic and other cultural development (that is, beyond provisioning basic needs) is an outcome of successfully harnessing larger amounts of energy. The more energy you can harness, the higher the level of technological and economic development possible, and the greater the range of possible action available to you. That is, sustained economic development, development of other areas of culture, and greater individual and collective free action are mutually related and dependent on harnessing larger amounts of energy.
The converse of this is that threats or barriers to the collection of energy resources are also direct threats to livelihood, development, and/or freedom of action. For many poor families in much of the developing world, a key energy resource is firewood, and lack of access to it for any number of reasons can be a distinct threat to the economic viability of a household. Within the current global economy, there is much concern over “energy independence.” This is especially the case in the U.S., with energy independence looking to be a major campaign issue for the 2008 presidential election.
Doug Wilson has written an interesting column on the issue recently in The Wall Street Journal, one of the few times, in my opinion, that something insightful and reasonable has appeared in the opinion section of that newspaper. (The column can be found at this link: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117772448976985558.html?mod=rss_opinion_main
Unfortunately, the full text is only available to subscribers to WSJ. A hard copy summary of the column can be found in the May 11, 2007 issue of The Week [p. 42]. Wilson also addresses the issue briefly in his account of his recent meeting with Rudy Guiliani at Townhall.com: http://www.townhall.com/Columnists/DougWilson/2006/09/18/breakfast_with_rudy?page=full)
Wilson writes that while energy independence might sound good, it is an illusion. In a context of global economic interdependency, no one and no nation-state can be energy independent. He argues that instead, we should focus on energy diversity. Greater diversity of energy resources and supply would enhance energy security, minimizing the risk of economic crisis as the result of a serious threat to oil (and with the current situations in Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Nigeria, even Venezuela, oil as an energy resource is threatened – reflected in the high price for gasoline paid by consumers in the U.S. and most other countries of the world).
I agree with Wilson that a focus on energy diversity makes more sense as a primary goal than a focus on energy independence. At the same time, I think he has a too absolutist notion of “independence.” If by “independence” or “freedom” is meant total freedom of action, then energy independence is not possible. Independence and freedom are always relative – all of us have some ability to shape and determine our own actions, but always within limits (See my earlier posts Freedom and Restraint, Parts I, II, and III). Wilson’s right, though, that a focus on energy independence is distracting. I’d add that energy diversity would bring about relative energy independence.
The language of “Energy Diversity” also has the advantage of creating an expectation of many sources of energy, some of which are environmentally destructive (alternative sources of oil, coal, maize-based ethanol), and some of which are environmentally friendly or at least less destructive (efforts to increase fuel economy of vehicles, sugar-based ethanol if it were allowed to compete head to head with the maize-based stuff, solar and wind power, hydro-power [with fish gates], nuclear, tidal, and geothermal power). Of course, environmentalists and others have been fighting this battle for over thirty years (originally over pollution concerns, now more and more over global warming concerns), but it’s encouraging that even opinion columns in The Wall Street Journal and Republican presidential candidates are showing interest in the issue. Their concern may be mainly about energy as a political and economic security issue (which is not inaccurate so much as it is limited), but so be it.
I do think, though, that White pointed out something essential about energy and culture. Obviously the meeting of basic needs is directly related to harnessing energy. Eating is the most fundamental way in which we harness energy that can then be used for other purposes. Individuals and societies that can’t harness the energy they need to provision all their essential needs must perish. What White was pointing out was that economic and other cultural development (that is, beyond provisioning basic needs) is an outcome of successfully harnessing larger amounts of energy. The more energy you can harness, the higher the level of technological and economic development possible, and the greater the range of possible action available to you. That is, sustained economic development, development of other areas of culture, and greater individual and collective free action are mutually related and dependent on harnessing larger amounts of energy.
The converse of this is that threats or barriers to the collection of energy resources are also direct threats to livelihood, development, and/or freedom of action. For many poor families in much of the developing world, a key energy resource is firewood, and lack of access to it for any number of reasons can be a distinct threat to the economic viability of a household. Within the current global economy, there is much concern over “energy independence.” This is especially the case in the U.S., with energy independence looking to be a major campaign issue for the 2008 presidential election.
Doug Wilson has written an interesting column on the issue recently in The Wall Street Journal, one of the few times, in my opinion, that something insightful and reasonable has appeared in the opinion section of that newspaper. (The column can be found at this link: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117772448976985558.html?mod=rss_opinion_main
Unfortunately, the full text is only available to subscribers to WSJ. A hard copy summary of the column can be found in the May 11, 2007 issue of The Week [p. 42]. Wilson also addresses the issue briefly in his account of his recent meeting with Rudy Guiliani at Townhall.com: http://www.townhall.com/Columnists/DougWilson/2006/09/18/breakfast_with_rudy?page=full)
Wilson writes that while energy independence might sound good, it is an illusion. In a context of global economic interdependency, no one and no nation-state can be energy independent. He argues that instead, we should focus on energy diversity. Greater diversity of energy resources and supply would enhance energy security, minimizing the risk of economic crisis as the result of a serious threat to oil (and with the current situations in Iraq, Iran, Sudan, Nigeria, even Venezuela, oil as an energy resource is threatened – reflected in the high price for gasoline paid by consumers in the U.S. and most other countries of the world).
I agree with Wilson that a focus on energy diversity makes more sense as a primary goal than a focus on energy independence. At the same time, I think he has a too absolutist notion of “independence.” If by “independence” or “freedom” is meant total freedom of action, then energy independence is not possible. Independence and freedom are always relative – all of us have some ability to shape and determine our own actions, but always within limits (See my earlier posts Freedom and Restraint, Parts I, II, and III). Wilson’s right, though, that a focus on energy independence is distracting. I’d add that energy diversity would bring about relative energy independence.
The language of “Energy Diversity” also has the advantage of creating an expectation of many sources of energy, some of which are environmentally destructive (alternative sources of oil, coal, maize-based ethanol), and some of which are environmentally friendly or at least less destructive (efforts to increase fuel economy of vehicles, sugar-based ethanol if it were allowed to compete head to head with the maize-based stuff, solar and wind power, hydro-power [with fish gates], nuclear, tidal, and geothermal power). Of course, environmentalists and others have been fighting this battle for over thirty years (originally over pollution concerns, now more and more over global warming concerns), but it’s encouraging that even opinion columns in The Wall Street Journal and Republican presidential candidates are showing interest in the issue. Their concern may be mainly about energy as a political and economic security issue (which is not inaccurate so much as it is limited), but so be it.
Tuesday, May 22, 2007
Global Trade and Free Action
In an earlier post, “Maintaining and Enhancing Free Action,” I argued that increasing individual freedom in general in any significant way required production of greater wealth. I further argued that this was a necessary but not sufficient condition for enhanced quality of life and real freedom for any significant number of people in global terms.
Much of Sub-Saharan Africa provides a case in point. Most of the African continent has been quite marginal to global trade, and its population, cut off from trade and much economic development, has suffered for it. (I’d argue that most of Africa has been thoroughly enough incorporated into global trade to be dependent on it, while simultaneously not integrated enough or in a way to benefit much from it.) One of the lead articles in the April 28 issue of The Economist, “Will Africa ever get it right?” (pp. 14 – 15), puts it bluntly:
“The post-colonial continent has hitherto been a colossal flop. The killer comparison is with Asia, where many countries suffered from the same colonial humiliations and rapacity that independent Africa customarily blamed for its early failings. According to the World Bank, real income per head in the 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa between 1960 and 2005 rose on average by 25%, while it leapt 34 times faster in East Asia; countries like South Korea and Malaysia were once as poor as Ghana and Kenya.”
I’d question whether many places in Asia suffered the same degree of “colonial humiliations and rapacity” as much of Sub-Saharan Africa, and I’d point out that trade and production of wealth in Africa was seriously set back by the continent’s role as major site for numerous Cold War proxy wars. (Parts of Asia experienced that, too, most obviously Korea and Vietnam – though in both of those cases, armed struggle ended long ago, whereas much of Africa has been beset by lingering, continuous, low-intensity armed conflict.) Still, this is to debate the cause of Africa’s economic marginality, and not its effect, which is clear: endemic grinding poverty.
Still, recently things are looking up for much of the continent. The same Economist article points out that the economies of many Sub-Saharan nations (and not just oil-exporting nations) are growing at annual rates of 6 – 7 % for the past several years. This has been accomplished via changes that have been conducive to trade and investment, such as more openness to private enterprise, moves toward democratization, freer markets, etc. There are many obstacles in the way of sustained development (continued political tension and violence in some countries, the recent election scandal in Nigeria, malaria and AIDS, recent indications that Global Warming may affect Africa especially severely, etc.), and I’m under no illusion that the wealth produced through increased trade will be distributed in equitable ways, but even small increases in the wealth of average persons could significantly alleviate the worst miseries of poverty in the continent.
In a recent article in The Washington Post, “Free Trade’s Great, But Offshoring Rattles Me,” economist Alan S. Blinder makes the case for how globalization, free trade, et al., will improve conditions for people around the world, but with the big caveat that it will not make things better for everyone. Blinder argues that two things are driving globalization, and associated phenomena such as offshoring or outsourcing. The first is technological innovation, especially in information and communication technology, the second being the more systematic entry of huge numbers of workers into the world economy in countries such as China, India, and Eastern Europe, workers willing and able to perform information based or manufacturing jobs more cheaply that workers in more developed nations.
Blinder writes:
“Looking at these two historic forces from the perspective of the world as a whole, one can only get a warm feeling. Improvements in technology will raise living standards, just as they have since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. And the availability of millions of new electronically deliverable service jobs in, say, India and China will help alleviate poverty on a mass scale. Offshoring will also reduce costs and boost productivity in the United States. So repeat after me: Globalization is good for the world. Which is where economists usually stop.”
Blinder doesn’t stop there. He also points out that globalization will have ill effects on some. Globalization and freer trade may be related to greater total production of wealth, but it also changes the distribution of wealth. In some ways this is good, as with the degree of poverty alleviation that increased numbers of jobs brings to places like India or China. For workers in the U.S. or Western Europe whose jobs are offshored, their share of wealth clearly drops, and as Blinder writes, this will potentially affect large numbers of people. “In some recent research, I estimated that 30 million to 40 million U.S. jobs are potentially offshorable. These include scientists, mathematicians, and editors on the high end and telephone operators, clerks and typists on the low end.”
Blinder argues that some reforms could be implemented to ease the transition, such as better economic safety nets for displaced workers, and changes to education to emphasize training for flexibility and for the sorts of jobs least likely to be offshored, but he is ultimately gloomy about the prospects of such reforms being implemented and warns of a rough transition for many Americans.
Globalization is not a panacea for people in China or India or Sub-Saharan Africa either. The jobs being offshored to such countries are generally low-wage (or else they wouldn’t be offshored there), and sometimes associated with dangerous working conditions. In an earlier post, “A Different Globalization for Labor,” I wrote:
“Another common assumption is that such globalization processes are also bad for labor in the developing nation contexts that manufacturing and service jobs are being outsourced to, e.g. promoting sweat shop labor conditions. Robert J. Flanagan has recently published an important book on this topic, Globalization and Labor Conditions (Oxford University Press, 2006). Flanagan closely examines the available data on labor conditions around the world. He is clearly sympathetic to critiques of globalization, but comes to the conclusion that overall, globalization has led to improved conditions for labor in much of the world. He in no way implies that globalization processes make things wonderful for workers in developing countries. As he documents, there are things like sweatshop labor associated with globalization, but there are more overall jobs and fewer jobs with the worst labor conditions in more open developing economies – hardly what I’d consider a ringing endorsement, but still having more crappy jobs available might be better than having fewer or no crappy jobs available, even while still not good.”
What do I conclude from all this? Globalization and more trade (and the greater production of wealth associated with it) has its problems – and major problems at that for workers in all countries. At the same time, globalization is here to stay, and to the extent that production of greater wealth is a precondition for increasing individual human freedom in general, there are positive developments associated with globalization as well. As Blinder points out, economists and other free trade apostles often emphasize what is positive or what they see as positive about globalization and ignore the rest. Leftists of a variety of stripes just as often emphasize what is negative or what they see as negative and ignore the rest. The goal, as I see it, should be an emphasis on more equitable distribution of wealth (which would entail things like better social safety networks, better job training and re-training programs, better regulation of work conditions globally, emphasis on freedom of speech and assembly so that workers could better organize and act collectively, emphasis on often neglected aspects of “free” trade – freer movement of labor and reduced agricultural subsidization in rich countries, etc.) within a system of global trade and development which is sustainable (which would require positive work on global warming and major diseases, such as malaria and AIDS).
Much of Sub-Saharan Africa provides a case in point. Most of the African continent has been quite marginal to global trade, and its population, cut off from trade and much economic development, has suffered for it. (I’d argue that most of Africa has been thoroughly enough incorporated into global trade to be dependent on it, while simultaneously not integrated enough or in a way to benefit much from it.) One of the lead articles in the April 28 issue of The Economist, “Will Africa ever get it right?” (pp. 14 – 15), puts it bluntly:
“The post-colonial continent has hitherto been a colossal flop. The killer comparison is with Asia, where many countries suffered from the same colonial humiliations and rapacity that independent Africa customarily blamed for its early failings. According to the World Bank, real income per head in the 48 countries of sub-Saharan Africa between 1960 and 2005 rose on average by 25%, while it leapt 34 times faster in East Asia; countries like South Korea and Malaysia were once as poor as Ghana and Kenya.”
I’d question whether many places in Asia suffered the same degree of “colonial humiliations and rapacity” as much of Sub-Saharan Africa, and I’d point out that trade and production of wealth in Africa was seriously set back by the continent’s role as major site for numerous Cold War proxy wars. (Parts of Asia experienced that, too, most obviously Korea and Vietnam – though in both of those cases, armed struggle ended long ago, whereas much of Africa has been beset by lingering, continuous, low-intensity armed conflict.) Still, this is to debate the cause of Africa’s economic marginality, and not its effect, which is clear: endemic grinding poverty.
Still, recently things are looking up for much of the continent. The same Economist article points out that the economies of many Sub-Saharan nations (and not just oil-exporting nations) are growing at annual rates of 6 – 7 % for the past several years. This has been accomplished via changes that have been conducive to trade and investment, such as more openness to private enterprise, moves toward democratization, freer markets, etc. There are many obstacles in the way of sustained development (continued political tension and violence in some countries, the recent election scandal in Nigeria, malaria and AIDS, recent indications that Global Warming may affect Africa especially severely, etc.), and I’m under no illusion that the wealth produced through increased trade will be distributed in equitable ways, but even small increases in the wealth of average persons could significantly alleviate the worst miseries of poverty in the continent.
In a recent article in The Washington Post, “Free Trade’s Great, But Offshoring Rattles Me,” economist Alan S. Blinder makes the case for how globalization, free trade, et al., will improve conditions for people around the world, but with the big caveat that it will not make things better for everyone. Blinder argues that two things are driving globalization, and associated phenomena such as offshoring or outsourcing. The first is technological innovation, especially in information and communication technology, the second being the more systematic entry of huge numbers of workers into the world economy in countries such as China, India, and Eastern Europe, workers willing and able to perform information based or manufacturing jobs more cheaply that workers in more developed nations.
Blinder writes:
“Looking at these two historic forces from the perspective of the world as a whole, one can only get a warm feeling. Improvements in technology will raise living standards, just as they have since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. And the availability of millions of new electronically deliverable service jobs in, say, India and China will help alleviate poverty on a mass scale. Offshoring will also reduce costs and boost productivity in the United States. So repeat after me: Globalization is good for the world. Which is where economists usually stop.”
Blinder doesn’t stop there. He also points out that globalization will have ill effects on some. Globalization and freer trade may be related to greater total production of wealth, but it also changes the distribution of wealth. In some ways this is good, as with the degree of poverty alleviation that increased numbers of jobs brings to places like India or China. For workers in the U.S. or Western Europe whose jobs are offshored, their share of wealth clearly drops, and as Blinder writes, this will potentially affect large numbers of people. “In some recent research, I estimated that 30 million to 40 million U.S. jobs are potentially offshorable. These include scientists, mathematicians, and editors on the high end and telephone operators, clerks and typists on the low end.”
Blinder argues that some reforms could be implemented to ease the transition, such as better economic safety nets for displaced workers, and changes to education to emphasize training for flexibility and for the sorts of jobs least likely to be offshored, but he is ultimately gloomy about the prospects of such reforms being implemented and warns of a rough transition for many Americans.
Globalization is not a panacea for people in China or India or Sub-Saharan Africa either. The jobs being offshored to such countries are generally low-wage (or else they wouldn’t be offshored there), and sometimes associated with dangerous working conditions. In an earlier post, “A Different Globalization for Labor,” I wrote:
“Another common assumption is that such globalization processes are also bad for labor in the developing nation contexts that manufacturing and service jobs are being outsourced to, e.g. promoting sweat shop labor conditions. Robert J. Flanagan has recently published an important book on this topic, Globalization and Labor Conditions (Oxford University Press, 2006). Flanagan closely examines the available data on labor conditions around the world. He is clearly sympathetic to critiques of globalization, but comes to the conclusion that overall, globalization has led to improved conditions for labor in much of the world. He in no way implies that globalization processes make things wonderful for workers in developing countries. As he documents, there are things like sweatshop labor associated with globalization, but there are more overall jobs and fewer jobs with the worst labor conditions in more open developing economies – hardly what I’d consider a ringing endorsement, but still having more crappy jobs available might be better than having fewer or no crappy jobs available, even while still not good.”
What do I conclude from all this? Globalization and more trade (and the greater production of wealth associated with it) has its problems – and major problems at that for workers in all countries. At the same time, globalization is here to stay, and to the extent that production of greater wealth is a precondition for increasing individual human freedom in general, there are positive developments associated with globalization as well. As Blinder points out, economists and other free trade apostles often emphasize what is positive or what they see as positive about globalization and ignore the rest. Leftists of a variety of stripes just as often emphasize what is negative or what they see as negative and ignore the rest. The goal, as I see it, should be an emphasis on more equitable distribution of wealth (which would entail things like better social safety networks, better job training and re-training programs, better regulation of work conditions globally, emphasis on freedom of speech and assembly so that workers could better organize and act collectively, emphasis on often neglected aspects of “free” trade – freer movement of labor and reduced agricultural subsidization in rich countries, etc.) within a system of global trade and development which is sustainable (which would require positive work on global warming and major diseases, such as malaria and AIDS).
Friday, May 18, 2007
Maintaining and Enhancing Free Action
Over the past several posts, I have been exploring the factors that shape human freedom. Of all of these, the factors that have the most important effect on human action are those that pertain to meeting basic essential needs. Without meeting basic needs, individual die, and so factors which shape or constrain the possible ways of meeting these needs are going to have tremendous influence patterning human action. For small societies (e.g. foraging bands or horticultural villages) with a direct relation to nature in providing for their basic needs, the physical qualities of their environment are going to be an important influence shaping and constraining possible strategies for living. For larger societies, where most have a more indirect relation to nature and make a living through their place in complex networks of economic exchange, the social possibilities within those economic networks will profoundly influence individuals’ range of possible free action.
For individuals living in small scale societies, being incorporated into larger societies and economies – which almost all small scale societies are – tends to entail a massive increase of social restraint on freedom, especially economic restraint (See also here my earlier post, “Freedom and Restraint: Part III”). The result is the social and economic malaise so common among Native American communities throughout the Western Hemisphere after being partially assimilated into Euro-American societies, as well as similar experiences among members of small scale societies in Eurasia, Africa, and Oceania over the past couple centuries. As these smaller societies continue to be further incorporated into the world economic system (frankly, to me that seems inevitable), a concern for these societies, but also anthropologists and any progressive thinking people is and should be to manage such transitions so that they have the least negative economic and political effect possible, the least negative effect on autonomy and freedom possible.
For the 6 billion or so people thoroughly incorporated into state structures and the global economy, greater autonomy in action can only come through greater wealth. Simply put, in the global economy as formulated, greater wealth equals greater ability to act freely. (Money, perhaps, can’t buy happiness, and greater wealth doesn’t free one completely from restraint, but it does free one from the unhappiness that derives simply from deprivation, allows one to go most anywhere one wants [including outer space nowadays if you’ve got enough], gets one a better shake before the law, buys a better education, etc.) Greater autonomy and freedom in general depends on continued expansion of economic production globally, though this is only a necessary but not sufficient condition, for it’s not just a question of per capita income or total income but the actual distribution of wealth.
For individuals living in small scale societies, being incorporated into larger societies and economies – which almost all small scale societies are – tends to entail a massive increase of social restraint on freedom, especially economic restraint (See also here my earlier post, “Freedom and Restraint: Part III”). The result is the social and economic malaise so common among Native American communities throughout the Western Hemisphere after being partially assimilated into Euro-American societies, as well as similar experiences among members of small scale societies in Eurasia, Africa, and Oceania over the past couple centuries. As these smaller societies continue to be further incorporated into the world economic system (frankly, to me that seems inevitable), a concern for these societies, but also anthropologists and any progressive thinking people is and should be to manage such transitions so that they have the least negative economic and political effect possible, the least negative effect on autonomy and freedom possible.
For the 6 billion or so people thoroughly incorporated into state structures and the global economy, greater autonomy in action can only come through greater wealth. Simply put, in the global economy as formulated, greater wealth equals greater ability to act freely. (Money, perhaps, can’t buy happiness, and greater wealth doesn’t free one completely from restraint, but it does free one from the unhappiness that derives simply from deprivation, allows one to go most anywhere one wants [including outer space nowadays if you’ve got enough], gets one a better shake before the law, buys a better education, etc.) Greater autonomy and freedom in general depends on continued expansion of economic production globally, though this is only a necessary but not sufficient condition, for it’s not just a question of per capita income or total income but the actual distribution of wealth.
Tuesday, May 15, 2007
Freedom and Restraint: Part II
I have written before about the importance of individual autonomy and the priority I place on it for ethical decision making. (See the post, "Tradition and Individual Autonomy.") In a post from a few days ago, “A Different Globalization for Labor,” I discussed Robert J. Flanagan’s book Globalization and Labor Conditions. In that post, I quoted and agreed with his argument that good policy decisions are those that enhance the opportunities of target populations. Likewise, in another post, “Are Some Cultures Better Than Others?,” I argued that any culture could be improved, by changes that enhance individuals’ autonomy and freedom. I very much agree with the words of the recently departed Mstislav Rostropovich (whose words I am quoting from a quotation in an editorial in the newsmagazine The Week from May 11, 2007), “Every man must have the right fearlessly to think independently and not merely to express with slightly different variation the opinions which have been inculcated in him.”
There are a number of restraints on freedom of individual human action, and that is the main topic of this post. In general, restraints on individual human autonomy can be divided into two types: natural restraints and social restraints, with social restraints to be discussed in my next blog entry. (I don’t mean to imply that these are clearly and absolutely distinct categories. Given the nature of human culture, various natural restraints are themselves shaped in part by human cultural practices, and social restraints are themselves shaped in part by environmental conditions and human biology. Still, the distinction is a useful one in making matters conceptually manageable.) Both natural and social restraints on freedom are present in all cultural contexts, but in very general terms, as social scale increases, natural restraints proportionally decrease in significance and social restraint generally increases in significance, though beginning in the modern era, various technologies became widely distributed with the effect of the possibility (but no guarantee) of increasing social scale and productivity alongside greater individual autonomy.
Natural Restraints
By natural restraints, I mean factors shaping and constraining free action that are not themselves social relations involving in some way the individuals whose autonomous action is being restrained. I have in mind here two sorts of restraints: human biological constants, and conditions of the physical environment which shape human action.
Human Biological Constants
Simply put, our biological composition and bodies shape the range of possibilities for human action. Biology in no way determines human action. Nor does it alone even determine the range of what is physically possible, for available technology shapes that as well, but the nature of our bodies clearly plays an important role in influencing what is possible (and what is not).
Most of what we do and experience is overwhelmingly shaped (alongside the variety of other factors I’ll address) by how our minds work, the nature of our sensory apparatus, the capabilities and limitations of physical ability, our libido and emotions (not biologically determined to be sure, but having biological components).
At the same time, once acknowledged, I’m less concerned here with such biological constants. While the role of biological constants cannot be ignored, as constants such factors are not instrumental in shaping any understanding of degrees of individual autonomy or differences in degrees of freedom across multiple contexts.
To refer to biological “constants” is not to imply that all humans are biologically identical. That would just be silly. Nor do I mean to imply that human biology is not shaped by a variety of other factors. It is, for example by long-term environmental conditions to which human populations biologically adapt (yielding patterns such as those described by Allen’s Rule, Bergmann’s Rule, or Thomsen’s Nose Rule), or by patterns of social behavior (e.g. the physical effects of exercise or different work patterns).
To speak of biological constants is intended instead to indicate that humans are relatively constant biologically, the physical variation existing within a narrow range for most traits. More importantly here, when it comes to human biology acting as a constraint on human free action, the effect is relatively constant. Arnold Swarzenneger can lift heavier objects than I can, and I can probably comfortably drive a smaller car than he, but while the details of our possible physical actions vary, there’s nothing about the types of activities either of us can engage in that’s different in any significant way. There are types of activities he can engage in that I can’t (because of the fact that he’s wealthy, a movie star, or the governor of California), but not on the basis of biological difference. There are biological differences that are significant for specific purposes (e.g. skin color in relation to a society’s long term history of exposure to ultraviolet radiation), but not generally for purposes of considering human autonomy (e.g. to the extent that skin color might be related to restraint on free action, it is for distinctly non-biological reasons).
Finally, technology might change all of this. Already, biotechnology has in some ways extended normal bodily capacity beyond what would have been the case before (e.g. the role of pacemakers in counteracting heart murmurs so that the heart functions normally). There’s no theoretical reason why biotechnology couldn’t more and more extend what is normal, and if we do enter into a thorough-going cyborg future, the idea of biological constants constraining possible action might be what seems fanciful, but we’re not there yet.
Environmental Conditions and Julian Steward’s Culture Core Argument
Environmental conditions do not determine human action in any culture, but they shape, influence, and restrain human action in all cultures.
When examining ways in which physical conditions of the environment shape and constrain human action, I find it useful to revisit Julian Steward’s “culture core” idea. It’s now an “old” idea (first fully laid out in his Theory of Culture Change from 1955), but hardly “out of date.” It has the advantage of being elegant and straightforward. It’s compatible with (in fact was a starting point for) cultural ecological and cultural materialist perspectives on relations between human practice and culture and the environment, but doesn’t require hardcore commitment to such perspectives in order to see its basic merits.
Steward’s reasoning starts with the straightforward fact that human beings have to meet certain basic needs in order to simply continue to exist, such as the need for adequate food, in some contexts the need for adequate shelter and clothing, etc. How humans go about meeting these needs is not straightforward at all, but that they must meet them - or die - is. Steward further argues that there is always a “culture core” that must maintain a certain degree of functionality. The culture core consists of those elements of culture directly related to meeting basic human needs.
The culture core is where the physical environment influences and possibly constrains cultural patterns most strongly. The culture core consists of patterns of behavior that must be performed using available resources. The nature and distribution of available resources shapes the possibilities for how people can go about making a living. In areas where resources are both plentiful and widely and evenly distributed, there may be many ways to go about meeting basic needs, and so the environment has a lesser constraining influence. In places where resources are scarce and widely scattered in distribution, there may be a much tighter range of possible ways to meet basic needs, and human action is more constrained as a result.
Technology plays a crucial role here. As societies develop technology that enable them to manipulate the physical environment to a greater degree, the environment is less of a constraining influence, or it at least constrains to a lesser degree, and the range of resources that can be utilized and the extent to which land itself might be used as a resource expands. The North American Great Plains are a great place to farm – if you have domesticated animals and steel plows (or tractors) that you’ve developed somewhere else.
In general then, environmental restraints are proportionally more important for smaller societies with lower levels of technology (though the exact nature and distribution of resources and the exact level of available technology shapes the specific degree and type of restraint that the environment plays), while larger societies are less constrained by the environment.
Even for the contemporary world with its global economy, though, the culture core concept and environmental constraint still apply. Basic needs still have to be met. There’s a quite large, but finite, range of ways in which that can currently be done, and crucially it’s not at all clear that current methods of producing basic needs are sustainable at the global level, which is a good reason for anthropologists and others who think mainly about human social relations to be cognizant of issues such as global warming, as well as human-environmental relations in general.
There are a number of restraints on freedom of individual human action, and that is the main topic of this post. In general, restraints on individual human autonomy can be divided into two types: natural restraints and social restraints, with social restraints to be discussed in my next blog entry. (I don’t mean to imply that these are clearly and absolutely distinct categories. Given the nature of human culture, various natural restraints are themselves shaped in part by human cultural practices, and social restraints are themselves shaped in part by environmental conditions and human biology. Still, the distinction is a useful one in making matters conceptually manageable.) Both natural and social restraints on freedom are present in all cultural contexts, but in very general terms, as social scale increases, natural restraints proportionally decrease in significance and social restraint generally increases in significance, though beginning in the modern era, various technologies became widely distributed with the effect of the possibility (but no guarantee) of increasing social scale and productivity alongside greater individual autonomy.
Natural Restraints
By natural restraints, I mean factors shaping and constraining free action that are not themselves social relations involving in some way the individuals whose autonomous action is being restrained. I have in mind here two sorts of restraints: human biological constants, and conditions of the physical environment which shape human action.
Human Biological Constants
Simply put, our biological composition and bodies shape the range of possibilities for human action. Biology in no way determines human action. Nor does it alone even determine the range of what is physically possible, for available technology shapes that as well, but the nature of our bodies clearly plays an important role in influencing what is possible (and what is not).
Most of what we do and experience is overwhelmingly shaped (alongside the variety of other factors I’ll address) by how our minds work, the nature of our sensory apparatus, the capabilities and limitations of physical ability, our libido and emotions (not biologically determined to be sure, but having biological components).
At the same time, once acknowledged, I’m less concerned here with such biological constants. While the role of biological constants cannot be ignored, as constants such factors are not instrumental in shaping any understanding of degrees of individual autonomy or differences in degrees of freedom across multiple contexts.
To refer to biological “constants” is not to imply that all humans are biologically identical. That would just be silly. Nor do I mean to imply that human biology is not shaped by a variety of other factors. It is, for example by long-term environmental conditions to which human populations biologically adapt (yielding patterns such as those described by Allen’s Rule, Bergmann’s Rule, or Thomsen’s Nose Rule), or by patterns of social behavior (e.g. the physical effects of exercise or different work patterns).
To speak of biological constants is intended instead to indicate that humans are relatively constant biologically, the physical variation existing within a narrow range for most traits. More importantly here, when it comes to human biology acting as a constraint on human free action, the effect is relatively constant. Arnold Swarzenneger can lift heavier objects than I can, and I can probably comfortably drive a smaller car than he, but while the details of our possible physical actions vary, there’s nothing about the types of activities either of us can engage in that’s different in any significant way. There are types of activities he can engage in that I can’t (because of the fact that he’s wealthy, a movie star, or the governor of California), but not on the basis of biological difference. There are biological differences that are significant for specific purposes (e.g. skin color in relation to a society’s long term history of exposure to ultraviolet radiation), but not generally for purposes of considering human autonomy (e.g. to the extent that skin color might be related to restraint on free action, it is for distinctly non-biological reasons).
Finally, technology might change all of this. Already, biotechnology has in some ways extended normal bodily capacity beyond what would have been the case before (e.g. the role of pacemakers in counteracting heart murmurs so that the heart functions normally). There’s no theoretical reason why biotechnology couldn’t more and more extend what is normal, and if we do enter into a thorough-going cyborg future, the idea of biological constants constraining possible action might be what seems fanciful, but we’re not there yet.
Environmental Conditions and Julian Steward’s Culture Core Argument
Environmental conditions do not determine human action in any culture, but they shape, influence, and restrain human action in all cultures.
When examining ways in which physical conditions of the environment shape and constrain human action, I find it useful to revisit Julian Steward’s “culture core” idea. It’s now an “old” idea (first fully laid out in his Theory of Culture Change from 1955), but hardly “out of date.” It has the advantage of being elegant and straightforward. It’s compatible with (in fact was a starting point for) cultural ecological and cultural materialist perspectives on relations between human practice and culture and the environment, but doesn’t require hardcore commitment to such perspectives in order to see its basic merits.
Steward’s reasoning starts with the straightforward fact that human beings have to meet certain basic needs in order to simply continue to exist, such as the need for adequate food, in some contexts the need for adequate shelter and clothing, etc. How humans go about meeting these needs is not straightforward at all, but that they must meet them - or die - is. Steward further argues that there is always a “culture core” that must maintain a certain degree of functionality. The culture core consists of those elements of culture directly related to meeting basic human needs.
The culture core is where the physical environment influences and possibly constrains cultural patterns most strongly. The culture core consists of patterns of behavior that must be performed using available resources. The nature and distribution of available resources shapes the possibilities for how people can go about making a living. In areas where resources are both plentiful and widely and evenly distributed, there may be many ways to go about meeting basic needs, and so the environment has a lesser constraining influence. In places where resources are scarce and widely scattered in distribution, there may be a much tighter range of possible ways to meet basic needs, and human action is more constrained as a result.
Technology plays a crucial role here. As societies develop technology that enable them to manipulate the physical environment to a greater degree, the environment is less of a constraining influence, or it at least constrains to a lesser degree, and the range of resources that can be utilized and the extent to which land itself might be used as a resource expands. The North American Great Plains are a great place to farm – if you have domesticated animals and steel plows (or tractors) that you’ve developed somewhere else.
In general then, environmental restraints are proportionally more important for smaller societies with lower levels of technology (though the exact nature and distribution of resources and the exact level of available technology shapes the specific degree and type of restraint that the environment plays), while larger societies are less constrained by the environment.
Even for the contemporary world with its global economy, though, the culture core concept and environmental constraint still apply. Basic needs still have to be met. There’s a quite large, but finite, range of ways in which that can currently be done, and crucially it’s not at all clear that current methods of producing basic needs are sustainable at the global level, which is a good reason for anthropologists and others who think mainly about human social relations to be cognizant of issues such as global warming, as well as human-environmental relations in general.
Monday, May 14, 2007
Freedom and Restraint: Part I
What does it mean to have freedom and autonomy?
Classical economic and political definitions of freedom (and neoliberal definitions as well) tend to work negatively, defining freedom as absence of formal restraint. Formal restraint would consist of deliberate actions intended to constrain the actions of others. Such freedom from formal restraint is important, e.g. freedom from restriction of speech or assembly.
As Peter Singer argues in Marx: A Very Short Introduction, one of Karl Marx’s most important contributions to thought was a new way of thinking about freedom, with freedom defined in positive terms. Marx recognized that the liberal conception of freedom as the absence of formal restraint was insufficient. Free wage labor means the laborer is freed from a formal obligation to work or to work a specific job. That’s not insignificant – it beats the alternatives of serfdom, slavery, debt peonage, or being sent to the labor house as a vagabond, but in no realistic sense does a worker have freedom to not work.
My conception of freedom and individual autonomy would similarly be framed positively as the ability to determine one’s own actions and personal destiny. I’m reminded of a statement by Peter Fonda’s character, leader of a motorcycle gang in the movie Wild Angels. The motorcycle gang have just ridden their bikes through a rural church and are generally tearing the place up when the preacher asks the Peter Fonda character what it is that they want. He responds, “We want to be free!” To which the preacher asks, “But what is it that you want to be free to do?” (A reasonable enough question.) “We want to be free to do what it is that we want to do.” There’s something absurd about the scene, especially with the over the top delivery of the lines, but completely free action and individual autonomy would entail being free to do what one wants to do, including being free to not know what one wants to do. The scene also indicates, what with the freedom-loving motorcycle riders ripping apart the church for no apparent reason, that there may be desirable limits to individual free action as well.
As I’ve argued elsewhere (see my earlier posts “Tradition and Individual Autonomy,” and “Are Some Cultures Better Than Others?”), I place tremendous importance on freedom and autonomy, though within the limits of one’s actions not seriously threatening or constraining those of others.
Also, in practice, though I prefer not to define freedom in the negative terms of restraint on action (those would be inhibitions to freedom, but not freedom – and the lack of such inhibitions is simply the lack of such inhibitions, rather than freedom itself, which again, I would conceptualize in the positive terms of ability to determine one’s own actions and personal destiny), all of us have our actions shaped and restrained by a variety of factors.
Among the factors that routinely restrain human action are human biology, physical conditions of the environment, power relations in interpersonal relations, economic relations, cultural custom and law. These will be the topics of my following two blog posts.
I should note at the onset of that short project, though, that while I generally feel that free action and autonomy are positive qualities, and that changes or policies that enhance individual autonomy are generally good, that doesn’t mean that I feel that all the restraints on free action that I’ll discuss are uniformly or straightforwardly bad. Some I would consider neutral – the nature of the human body places limits on what we’re physically capable of doing, but I find it hard to consider that either good or bad. Other restraints on free action are clearly not bad. Legal restraints prohibiting ripping apart someone’s church with motorcycles for no good reason other than one felt like it are a good thing. As I write this, I just got home from my parents’ house where I celebrated Mother’s Day. There was no formal restraint forcing me to celebrate Mother’s Day. Like any reasonably good son, I didn’t mind and quite enjoyed honoring my mother on this day. At the same time, I couldn’t not celebrate Mother’s Day. This was a different type of restraint from legal restraint or economic restraint, but my free action, technically speaking, was constrained, albeit in a way I didn’t mind at all and am quite fond of. In other words, over my next few posts, what I’ll be interested in is simply discussing the various factors which shape and constrain individual free action, without assuming that all such factors are undesirable or socially negative.
Classical economic and political definitions of freedom (and neoliberal definitions as well) tend to work negatively, defining freedom as absence of formal restraint. Formal restraint would consist of deliberate actions intended to constrain the actions of others. Such freedom from formal restraint is important, e.g. freedom from restriction of speech or assembly.
As Peter Singer argues in Marx: A Very Short Introduction, one of Karl Marx’s most important contributions to thought was a new way of thinking about freedom, with freedom defined in positive terms. Marx recognized that the liberal conception of freedom as the absence of formal restraint was insufficient. Free wage labor means the laborer is freed from a formal obligation to work or to work a specific job. That’s not insignificant – it beats the alternatives of serfdom, slavery, debt peonage, or being sent to the labor house as a vagabond, but in no realistic sense does a worker have freedom to not work.
My conception of freedom and individual autonomy would similarly be framed positively as the ability to determine one’s own actions and personal destiny. I’m reminded of a statement by Peter Fonda’s character, leader of a motorcycle gang in the movie Wild Angels. The motorcycle gang have just ridden their bikes through a rural church and are generally tearing the place up when the preacher asks the Peter Fonda character what it is that they want. He responds, “We want to be free!” To which the preacher asks, “But what is it that you want to be free to do?” (A reasonable enough question.) “We want to be free to do what it is that we want to do.” There’s something absurd about the scene, especially with the over the top delivery of the lines, but completely free action and individual autonomy would entail being free to do what one wants to do, including being free to not know what one wants to do. The scene also indicates, what with the freedom-loving motorcycle riders ripping apart the church for no apparent reason, that there may be desirable limits to individual free action as well.
As I’ve argued elsewhere (see my earlier posts “Tradition and Individual Autonomy,” and “Are Some Cultures Better Than Others?”), I place tremendous importance on freedom and autonomy, though within the limits of one’s actions not seriously threatening or constraining those of others.
Also, in practice, though I prefer not to define freedom in the negative terms of restraint on action (those would be inhibitions to freedom, but not freedom – and the lack of such inhibitions is simply the lack of such inhibitions, rather than freedom itself, which again, I would conceptualize in the positive terms of ability to determine one’s own actions and personal destiny), all of us have our actions shaped and restrained by a variety of factors.
Among the factors that routinely restrain human action are human biology, physical conditions of the environment, power relations in interpersonal relations, economic relations, cultural custom and law. These will be the topics of my following two blog posts.
I should note at the onset of that short project, though, that while I generally feel that free action and autonomy are positive qualities, and that changes or policies that enhance individual autonomy are generally good, that doesn’t mean that I feel that all the restraints on free action that I’ll discuss are uniformly or straightforwardly bad. Some I would consider neutral – the nature of the human body places limits on what we’re physically capable of doing, but I find it hard to consider that either good or bad. Other restraints on free action are clearly not bad. Legal restraints prohibiting ripping apart someone’s church with motorcycles for no good reason other than one felt like it are a good thing. As I write this, I just got home from my parents’ house where I celebrated Mother’s Day. There was no formal restraint forcing me to celebrate Mother’s Day. Like any reasonably good son, I didn’t mind and quite enjoyed honoring my mother on this day. At the same time, I couldn’t not celebrate Mother’s Day. This was a different type of restraint from legal restraint or economic restraint, but my free action, technically speaking, was constrained, albeit in a way I didn’t mind at all and am quite fond of. In other words, over my next few posts, what I’ll be interested in is simply discussing the various factors which shape and constrain individual free action, without assuming that all such factors are undesirable or socially negative.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)